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WHY PLAIN MEANING?
David A. Strauss*
"In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning."' The Supreme
Court says something like this time and again in cases involving the
interpretation of a statute.2 The basic idea-that the interpretation of
a statute begins by considering the ordinary meaning of its wordsseems obviously right. Indeed it is hard to see where else one could
begin. But the justification for this approach is not so obvious. The
justification is important, because it may tell us something about how
readily we may depart from the ordinary meaning of the statute, and
in what direction to move when we do depart from it.
Is the justification for relying on "ordinary" or "plain" meaning (I
will treat the two terms as interchangeable) that the ordinary meaning
of the language is the best indication of what the legislature intended?
Or that, whatever Congress intended, under the Constitution only the
plain language has been duly enacted? Or that any other approach
gives the judges who interpret the statutes too much discretion? Or
that only a plain language approach can adequately discipline the legislature to adopt laws that truly reflect what it is trying to accomplish?
All of these justifications have a degree of plausibility, but none of
them is entirely satisfactory.
In this essay I will consider another justification, a justification
suggested by one of Frederick Schauer's essays. Plain meaning is the
place to begin in interpreting statutes, not because the meaning best
reflects the legislature's intentions, or for any of the other reasons
usually given, but just because the ordinary meaning is an obvious
point of agreement in circumstances in which disagreement is too
costly. Sometimes it is more important that things be settled than that
they be settled right; ordinary meaning provides a way to settle things.
The reason to settle them in this way is not that an authoritative body
* Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1 Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990).
2 See, for a very recent example, Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, Office of
Workers Compensation Programs, Dep't of Labor, 117 S.Ct. 796, 801 (1997).
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enacted the words. It is simply that the words are a convenient, easy
way to get matters settled.
Fred Schauer has written so much that is so good, that it does not
do him justice to ascribe any single virtue to his work. But his work on
interpretation bears Professor Schauer's trademark combination of
sophistication and common sense. Sometimes the controversy about
the soundness of the "plain meaning" approach to statutory construction becomes a battle of shibboleths. One side insists that plain meaning is a sure guide, ignoring or downplaying the problems that that
approach presents; the other side insists that there is no such thing as
plain meaning, ignoring the common sense intuition to the contrary.
To his great credit, Schauer has no patience for either position.
Of course one cannot determine the "plain meaning" of words without accepting a variety of background assumptions established by the
culture (including, in the case of statutes, the political culture). But
of course it is also sophomoric to maintain that there is never any such
thing as a plain meaning accessible to speakers of the language. If we
are going to make progress on issues-issues of interpretation, but
also other issues Schauer has discussed over the years, such as free
speech-we have to acknowledge the common sense arguments. But
we also have to grapple with the problems they raise, free of the pretense that the issues are easy or can be solved by reflex allegiance to
familiar positions. That is one of the great lessons that Schauer's work
teaches, and it teaches it not just explicitly but, time and again, by
example. Schauer's article on interpretation, which puts forward an
approach much like the one I am suggesting here, is one among many
examples of this.3
I.

THE SIMPLE CASE

In countless settings, the plain meaning approach is so instinctive
that it does not begin to be controversial. If people want to know what
the speed limit is, or how many witnesses must sign a will to make it
valid, or whether they can build a gas station on a vacant lot, they look
at the relevant piece of legislation and read its words. That will almost
always be enough to give them their answer. The notion that they
should do something other than read the words, and assign them the
intuitively obvious meaning, is so alien that it is difficult even to describe what the alternative would be. No one would seriously say, for
example, that the words of the controlling statute or ordinance are
merely recommendations, a starting point for a discussion about
3 See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the CoordinatingFunction of
Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 231.
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whether it makes sense to allow people to drive faster on that stretch
of road than the speed limit permits.
It is worth reflecting for a moment on the justification for even
this incontestable conclusion. It seems to go along these lines: the
statute setting the speed limit was adopted by a legislature that, perhaps because it was elected by the people, is entitled to decide this
question. We are (ordinarily at least, leaving aside such issues as civil
disobedience) obligated to comply with its decisions. When the legislature makes such a decision, it tells us what its decision is by writing it
in the form of a statute and promulgating it as such. The language of
the statute therefore reflects what the legislature, whose decisions we
are obligated to follow, has decided on this matter.
Even this simple account makes a number of assumptions. Some
might question, for example, whether it makes sense to speak of what
"the legislature," a collective body, has decided. Only individuals, it
might be said, can make decisions. The legislature's supposed decision actually reflects the outcome of some method for aggregating
individual choices; to speak of the legislature's "decision" is to treat
the legislature as a person, which it is not. Sometimes of course there
will be force to this objection. But in many cases there will not be. We
can meaningfully say, in many contexts, that a collective body has
reached a decision. If we can say-as we comfortably do-that a
group of people has decided to go out to lunch together, then in principle we can say that a legislature has decided On a speed limit. It will
not always be right to speak of the legislature's collective intentions in
this way, but sometimes it will be.
Even apart from that, though, the justification I just gave for the
plain meaning approach to statutory construction-what I will call the
"simple case" justification-rests on a number of assumptions that are
so instinctive that it is hard to make them fully explicit. This is a point
that Schauer has made as well as anyone. 4 We assume that the legislature will express its decision by speaking in a certain way, a way that
makes an ordinary meaning approach appropriate. There are times
when a plain meaning approach to a text is exactly the wrong way to
proceed. Some authoritative sources might speak in parables, like
parts of the Bible, or in riddles, like the Oracle at Delphi. Some important texts are written ironically, so that they say something like the
opposite of what they mean. To interpret those texts according to the
plain meaning of the words would be hopelessly obtuse. So even in
4 See, e.g., id. at 251; FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuIES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 207-08 (1991).

EXAMINATION OF
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the simple case, the plain meaning approach rests on important understandings about how a legislature behaves.
Moreover, the so-called "ordinary meaning" is not so ordinary. It
is the ordinary legal meaning-another Schauer point.5 Terms like
"witness," "zoning," and even "speed limit," when used in a legal context, can mean something quite different from what they might mean
when used in other contexts. Even in the simple case, we are assuming that the legislature is expressing its decisions in a distinctive legal
language. It is the ordinary meaning of the terms in that language
that governs.
Once all these assumptions are made-no doubt some others are
needed as well-the justification for using plain or ordinary meaning
in the simple case does appear to hold up. The problem with the
"plain meaning" approach on which the Supreme Court relies so
heavily-and which has such vigorous and compelling defenders 6-is
that it is used not just in the simple case. It is used as well in cases in
which we cannot say, with any confidence, that the legislature reached
any decision on the issue in dispute. The question is whether the justification for the plain meaning approach that works in the simple
case can be carried over to those other cases, which are the ones that
end up in litigation.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,7 one of the most celebrated plain
language cases, is an example. Hill concerned the Endangered Species Act, which provides, in Section 7, that once the Secretary of the
Interior has designated a species as "endangered," "[a] 11 other Federal
departments and agencies shall ... tak[e] such action necessary to

insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not
jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species."
The Secretary of the Interior had designated as endangered a fish,
apparently otherwise quite undistinguished, known as the snail darter.
At the time the snail darter's only known habitat was in a part of the
Lower Tennessee River that would have been inundated if the TVA
had placed into operation a dam that it had built on the river-a dam
that was virtually completely constructed, at the cost of more than
$100 million.
5 See Schauer, supra note 3, at 234 n.6.
6

See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in A Civil-Law System: The Role of

United States Federal Courts in Interpretingthe Constitutionand Laws, in MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann et al. eds., 1997).
7 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
8 Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 7, 87 Stat. 884, 892 (1973) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994)).
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The Supreme Court ruled that the dam could not be opened. It
stated that "[o] ne would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision
whose terms were any plainer than those of § 7 of the Endangered
Species Act."9 That plain statutory language, the Court said, prohibited the TVA from opening the dam. Some passages in the Court's
opinion suggested that the Court believed Congress had actually focused on the specific kind of case presented by the snail darter-one
in which there was an apparently great disparity between the costs of
protecting an endangered species and the importance of the species-and had deliberately decided that protection of the endangered
species took priority. If Congress had done so, then Hillwould resemble what I called the simple case-the text of the statute, read according to its ordinary meaning, expressed a shared legislative
understanding on precisely the point in dispute.
In the end, however, the Supreme Court eschewed reliance on
the idea that Congress had specifically anticipated this case. The
Court said: "It is not for us to speculate, much less act, on whether
Congress would have altered its stance had the specific events of this
case been anticipated." 10 This is the situation-common in cases that
reach litigation-that presents problems for the plain language approach. It is one thing to say that the obligation to comply with the
decisions of a democratic (or other authoritative) decisionmaker requires us to follow the plain language approach in the simple case,
when that language encodes the decision that was made on the question at issue. It is quite another to say that we should follow that approach when the language cannot plausibly be said to reflect a
decision, by the authoritative body, on the point in dispute. In those
circumstances, reliance on plain language is open to the charge of
being a fetish-of endowing the words with a significance that is not
warranted. Much of the intuitive appeal of the plain language approach in statutory interpretation cases, I believe, derives from uncritically extrapolating the logic of the simple case to cases like Hill-cases
that are surely less common in the world at large, but probably much
more common than the simple case in the world of litigation.
II.

PLAIN LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE INTENTIONS

Most of the justifications commonly given for the plain language
approach founder, at least to some extent, on this difficulty. Often,
for example, the Supreme Court says that the ordinary meaning of the
plain language is the best indication of what the legislature in9 Hill, 437 U.S. at 173.
10 Id. at 185.
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tended.' Of course, as many have pointed out, the notion of a legislative intention is highly problematic.1 2 Intentions can be specified
on any number of different levels. (A legislator might vote for a tax
reduction in order to return a favor for a colleague, help a constituent, position herself for the next election, squeeze social spending,
enhance economic growth, or any combination of those reasons, for
example.) In any event, legislators may agree on language even
though they all intend different things. But even assuming, as I did in
the simple case, that the notion of a legislative intent is coherent and
useful, the question arises whether the ordinary meaning of the language is a reliable indication of that intent.
Even when the question in dispute before a court actually did
occur to the members of the legislature, or to some number of them,
it is far from clear that the plain language will reliably reflect how they
wanted to resolve it. Sometimes the language of a particular provision
is drafted and considered by the members of the legislature with great
care. In such circumstances, it seems plausible to say that the language is the best indication of the legislature's intent. Even so there
are problems with this claim. It is unlikely that more than a small
percentage of the members of the legislature will actually sit down and
participate in drafting the language. One will have to attribute their
intentions to their colleagues who voted for the measure. But at least
one can say that some members of a legislative body deliberately
drafted language with a specific problem in mind, and the other
members, acting with full knowledge, adopted that language, and
therefore the language in a significant sense reflects the intentions of
the legislature.
But litigation seldom arises in such instances. If the members of
a legislature foresaw an issue and specifically drafted the language of a
statute to resolve that precise issue, then the chances are good that
there will be no reasonable grounds for dispute over how the statute
should be interpreted when that issue arises. Litigation comes about
either because of a failure of foresight by the legislature, or a dispute
over just how to characterize the issue that the legislature did foresee,
or because the legislature, while perhaps foreseeing the issue, inadver11 See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) ("[D]eference to the
supremacy of the Legislature, as well as recognition that Congressmen typically vote
on the language of a bill, generally requires us to assume that 'the legislative purpose
is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used."') (quoting Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)).
12 The point has been made many times; for a classic statement, see Max Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv 863, 870-75 (1930).

HeinOnline -- 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1570 1996-1997

1997]

WHY

PLAIN MEANING?

1571

tently or advertently did not draft language with sufficient clarity to
foreclose further dispute.
In Smith v. United States,1 3 for example, the question was whether
exchanging a gun for narcotics constituted "use" of a firearm "during
and in relation to ... [a] drug trafficking crime" within the meaning
4
of a federal statute that imposes an enhanced penalty for such "use."'
The case is particularly notable, for purposes of the plain language
approach, because both the opinion of the Court, by Justice
O'Connor, and the dissenting opinion, by Justice Scalia, claimed to
5
follow the ordinary meaning of the plain language of the statute.'
The Court concluded that bartering a weapon "[s]urely ... can be
described as 'use' within the everyday meaning of that term."16 Justice
Scalia insisted that the majority "does not appear to grtsp the distinction between how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is used."'7
Whichever side has the better of that argument, one thing seems
clear: the statute was not drafted with this case in mind. No responsible drafter who had been asked to write the statute in a way that resolved this issue could claim that the language of the statute does so.
Of course sometimes a legislature will draft language deliberately in
order to avoid resolving an issue.' 8 Then, too, it is of course pointless-it is perfectly circular-for the Court to try to resolve the case by
treating the plain meaning, as the best evidence of the legislature's
intention. (The legislature's intention was to pass the buck to the
courts.) Buck-passing is not a likely explanation for Smith, however;
the issue was just not sufficiently controversial, and Congress's attention was no doubt focused on the core case addressed by the statute,
one in which the gun is used as a weapon.
In Smith, the only conclusion that can reliably be drawn from the
language is that the legislature (or some subgroup of members who
were involved in the drafting, or supervised the drafting, or carefully
examined the text) did not think about this specific problem. Perhaps one might say that the language, as written, did not strike the
members of the legislature as resolving this specific problem in the
wrong way; if it had, they would have changed it. Even that assumes
that the legislators knew what the language was, scrutinized it care13
14
15
16
17
18

508 U.S. 223 (1993).
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1994).
See, e.g., Smith, 508 U.S. at 228; id. at 241-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 228.
Id. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Landgrafv. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 263 (1994) ("[Tlhe history

of the .

.

. Act conveys the impression that legislators agreed to disagree about

whether and to what extent the Act would apply to preenactment conduct.").
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fully, and foresaw the cases that might come up. All of those assumptions are probably unrealistic except in very unusual circumstances.
Whenever a dispute about the interpretation of a statute is evenly-balanced enough to make a court hesitate about the right answer, it will
be a safe bet that either the legislature passed the buck, or it did not
focus on the precise issue at stake. Otherwise the language would not
be so unclear.
In fact, the matter is even worse than this. Even when Congress
does specifically anticipate an issue, plain language may not be a reliable guide to its intentions. The "plain language" approach, in a court,
involves more than a quick or casual reading of the statute. It means
that every word, indeed every punctuation mark of the statute, will be
examined with enormous intensity and care by parties operating in an
adversarial setting, often with much at stake. It would not be surprising if lawyers examining a statute in those circumstances were able to
find "meanings" that wholly escaped even a relatively careful legislative drafter.
The problem is one of a difference in incentives. The parties to
litigation are focused on one specific interpretive issue. The stakes
will often be very large; in general, they have to be large, or it would
not make sense for the parties to carry their dispute into court. A
great deal of talent and energy will be directed to squeezing every last
ounce of "plain meaning" out of the language in question. Legislative
drafters will seldom-very seldom-have an incentive to devote so
much energy to scrutinizing the possible interpretation of statutory
language. They will draft the language with care, but not with so
much care that they have anticipated every possible interpretation of
the language that a highly-motivated team of lawyers and judges might
come up with over the course of several years' litigation. When the
judicial inquiry into "plain meaning" is so much more intensive than
the legislative inquiry, the judicial inquiry will often be a bad vehicle
for discovering the understandings that the legislature had.
III.

DOES THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRE

THE PLAIN MEANING APPROACH?

A second reason commonly given for relying on the ordinary
meaning of a statute is a more formal one. Justice Scalia, who has
vigorously and effectively criticized the notion that the plain meaning
encodes the legislature's intentions, nonetheless is, of course, a strong
proponent of the plain meaning approach, for a different reason:
"The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed ....
A
statute ... has a claim to our attention simply because Article I, sec-
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tion 7 of the Constitution provides that since it has been passed by the
prescribed majority... it is the law." 19
Of course it is true that the text passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the President is the law, under Article I, Section 7.
But Article I, Section 7 does not say anything explicit about what to do
when a dispute arises about what a duly-enacted statute requires or
permits. Examining the ordinary meaning is only one possible approach to resolving such a dispute. One might alternatively look to
the legislative history, or adopt an interpretation that promotes the
statute's apparent purposes. Or theoretically, as some Legal Realists
suggest, ajudge might, in case of any ambiguity, disregard any indicia
of legislative intent and simply interpret the statute in a way that promoted what the judge thought was the best policy, all things considered.20 Few would endorse that last approach, perhaps, but not
because Article I, Section 7 specifically precludes it. In order to
choose among these various approaches, one must do more than simply point to Article I, Section 7.
Here again, the argument for the plain language approach seems
to be based on an unwarranted extrapolation from the simple case I
described above. Recall that, in order to explain why we rely on the
ordinary meaning of the words in the simple case, one has to invoke a
number of assumptions-that the legislature does not speak in riddles, that it relies on the specialized legal meanings of words, and so
on. We also had to rely on the assumption that the legislature has the
authority to make certain decisions, and that its enactments are binding, not merely hortatory or a starting point for further consideration
of the appropriate course of action. These assumptions are surely correct, but they are not spelled out in Article I, Section 7. That is, even
in the simple case, Article I, Section 7, standing alone, does not tell us
how to interpret a statute. It follows that it does not tell us what to do
when there is a dispute about the proper interpretation of a statute.
Justice Scalia, in his latest detailed discussion of the plain meaning approach, effectively concedes this point, perhaps without recognizing that he has. Justice Scalia acknowledges that the plain meaning
is not always decisive. He says that he would make allowances for
i'scrivener's error,' where on the very face of the statute it is clear to

19

Scalia, supranote 6, at 22, 35; see also
supra note 6, at 65.

LAWRENCE

H. TRIBE, Comment, inA MAT-

TER OF INTERPRETATION

20

See Radin, supra note 12.
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the reader that a mistake of expression (rather than of legislative wisdom) has been made." 2 1 This is surely a sensible approach.
But under Article I, Section 7, the statute that was enacted is the
statute as written, scrivener's error and all. Nothing in Article I, Section 7 specifically authorizes ajudge to correct scriveners' errors. The
authority to do so must derive from an assumption like the others that
we make. If Article I, Section 7 permits courts to depart from the
ordinary meaning of the words Congress enacted in order to correct a
scrivener's error, why does it not permit such a departure for other
reasons as well? There may be answers, but a more elaborate argument is needed.
IV.

PLAIN MEANING AS A PENALTY DEFAULT RULE

A third justification for the plain language approach borrows
from a notion used in the law of contracts, another area, of course,
where the interpretation of a text is at issue. This is the notion of a
"penalty default rule." A default rule is a rule that supplies the meaning of a contract term that the parties have not specified. One approach to determining what the default rules should be is to choose a
rule that best captures what the parties would have agreed to, had they
addressed the issue. The idea behind a penalty default rule, however,
is not to capture the parties' likely intentions, but to specify a default
rule that is so unattractive to the parties that they will have an incen22
tive to avoid its application by specifying their intentions.
The plain language approach might be seen as a penalty default.
As I have said, in a case that the legislature probably did not consider,
the ordinary meaning of the language is not especially likely to be a
good guide to what the legislature actually wanted to do. But the
"penalty default" justification does not assume that the language accurately reflects the legislature's intentions. Rather, the idea is that the
legislature, knowing that the courts will interpret the statute according to its plain language-no matter what conflicting indications of
legislative intent there might be-will take special care to be sure that
the plain language reflects its intentions. The plain language approach therefore serves the function of disciplining the legislature so
that it expresses its intentions directly in the language of the statute
21 Scalia, supra note 6, at 20. Justice Scalia applied this doctrine in Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
22 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87 (1989); Lon L. Fuller, ConsiderationandForm, 41
COLUM. L. REv. 799 (1941) (calling such a default rule a "formality").
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and does not depend on the courts to clean up ambiguous or otherwise ill-drafted statutes.
The use of a penalty default rule, in the interpretation of either a
statute or a contract, obviously depends on a weighing of costs and
benefits. Someone who defends the plain language approach on penalty default grounds is saying, in effect, that she is willing to risk interpreting the statute in a way of which the legislature would disapprove.
That is the whole idea of a penalty default: to do something that the
legislature will find unattractive, so as to give it an incentive to be
more precise or explicit in the future. This cost is offset, according to
advocates of this approach, by the benefit-which is that the legislature, in the future, will draft more carefully, thus reducing both the
number of difficult cases of statutory interpretation and the chance
that in those future cases the court will misunderstand the decision
that the legislature made.
The principal problem with this approach is that it is not clear
why we should assume that the benefits will outweigh the undoubted
costs. No doubt some disputes about statutory construction, with their
attendant costs of litigation and risks of erroneous decision, could be
averted if the legislative drafters were more careful or used more effort to foresee the situations that might arise under the statute. But
sometimes the costs of making the plain language specify the result
the legislature desires will be very great. Changes in circumstances
may be difficult or impossible to foresee. Drafting to cover every possible contingency may simply be too time-consuming. In these circumstances, applying a penalty default rule could just lead to a
potentially perverse result, with no offsetting gain.
In fact, even when there are no unforeseen circumstances, the
penalty default approach to statutory construction will often be inappropriate, because of an important distinction between statutes and
contracts. When a penalty default rule is applied because of a gap in
the wording of a contract, the persons who are penalized are the parties to the contract. They were in a position to do something about
the problem; they could have drafted language to fill the gap. It
makes sense to give them an incentive to do so.
The people who are in a position to do something about gaps in
statutes are the legislators (and their agents). When a plain meaning
approach is applied to the interpretation of a statute on a penalty default rationale, the members of the legislature are, in a sense, potentially penalized, because their intentions, by hypothesis, might have
been thwarted. But others might be penalized, too: the persons
whom the legislature intended to benefit. They may not be in a position to do anything about poor drafting (assuming they do not have
HeinOnline -- 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1575 1996-1997
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access to well-organized lobbying groups), and it may be particularly
unfair to saddle them with the consequences of Congress's poor drafting in the hope of giving Congress an incentive to do better in the
future.
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Locki 3 is an example. Locke involved a federal statute that provided that a firm wishing to renew an unpatented mining claim had to make a specified
filing "prior to December 31."24 The Court rejected the argument
that a claim filed on December 31 should be allowed. As a result a
claim was forfeited. This may even be a case of a scrivener's error; the
end of the year is a much more customary deadline, and there is a
good chance that the understanding of the members of Congress, to
the extent there was one, was that the renewal had to be filed "by
December 31."
The logic of the penalty default approach would hold that the
Court reached the right conclusion in Locke. The problem was not
one that Congress was unable to foresee. If there was an error, it was
just a case of sloppy drafting. Congress should be given an incentive
to draft carefully. The Court's opinion in Locke emphasized, as a reason for taking such a strict plain meaning approach, that the case involved a filing deadline. 25 If one accepts the penalty default rationale,
a filing deadline is, arguably, an especially suitable occasion for applying it: Congress should not be allowed to get away with sloppiness in
the drafting of filing deadlines and count on the courts to find an
equitable way out. That would undermine the entire purpose of having filing deadlines in the first place. In dealing with filing deadlines,
perhaps above all, Congress's mistakes should be treated unforgivingly, so that Congress is given every incentive to draft carefully.
The problem, of course, is that Congress was not the principal
party who suffered because of the (probable) sloppy drafting. The
firm whose claim was canceled bore the brunt of the penalty. The
argument in support of the penalty default approach would have to be
that even that price-inflicting a substantial harm on a firm that acted
in a way that might have complied with Congress's intentions,
although not with the plain language-was worth paying in order to
give Congress an incentive to draft with precision. That seems to be a
difficult argument to make out. When the reason for a lack of preci23 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
24 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a) (1994).
25 See Locke, 471 U.S. at 93 ("[W]ith respect to filing deadlines a literal reading of
Congress's words is generally the only proper reading of those words.").
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sion is not sloppiness but the unforeseeability of an issue, the basis for
the penalty default argument is even weaker.
V.

LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY AND JUDIcIAL RESTRAINT

A final justification rests on legislative supremacy and the need
forjudicial restraint. AsJustice Scalia puts it, in explaining why judges
should follow the plain language rather than seek legislative intent
from legislative history or other sources:
The... threat is that, under the guise or even the self-delusion of
pursuing unexpressed legislative intents ....judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires ....

When you are told to de-

cide, not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on the basis of
what it meant, and are assured that there is no necessary connection
between the two, your best shot at figuring out what the legislature
meant is to ask yourself what a wise and intelligent person should
have meant; and that will surely bring you to the conclusion that the
26
law means what you think it ought to mean.
Again this is a plausible argument. But it rests on a number of
empirical and normative premises that are not obvious. It assumes,
first, that ajudge who looks at legislative history or statutory purpose
instead of just at the plain language has more latitude to indulge her
own views, advertently or inadvertently, than a judge who considers
herself bound to the plain language. Often this is true, but it is not
always true. United States v. Smith2 7, the case about whether bartering a
gun constituted "using" it, is a counterexample; the language was uncertain enough to allow ajudge to read her own views into the statute,
consciously or not.
In addition, Justice Scalia's argument assumes that the outcome,
if a judge is influenced by her own views, is likely to be worse than if
the judge follows the plain language of the statute. This is another
one of those defenses of plain language that owes much of its plausibility to an uncritical extrapolation from the "simple case." Assuming,
as we must, that the judge should subordinate her judgments to those
of the legislature (issues of constitutionality aside), then ifthe plain
language faithfully reflects the legislature's judgments, it is certainly
true that a judge should not substitute her own views for what the
plain language of the statute seems to say. But if the plain language
does not reflect the legislative understanding, then the conclusion
that the judge should not substitute her views for the plain language
does not necessarily follow.
26 Scalia, supra note 6, at 17-18.
27 508 U.S. 223 (1993); see supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
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If the drafting is shoddy, or if Congress has not foreseen the issue
before the court, then the ordinary meaning of the language of the
statute will not be a particularly good indication of the legislature's
judgments. Following the ordinary meaning might just lead to a result that the legislature would find arbitrary or perverse. There is at
least a good chance that that would have been the legislature's reaction to the decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 2 8 and Smith v.
United States, and an excellent chance that the legislature would have
had that reaction to the decision in Locke2 9 . If the idea is to vindicate
legislative supremacy, then following language that does not track the
legislature's understandings may be a poor way to do it. Ajudge who
instead directly tries to implement the legislature's purposes may do
better. She may do better even if, as Justice Scalia suggests, her own
views about the advisability of different interpretations of the statute
affect her decision. After all, the judge's views about what makes
sense may not deviate that far from the legislature's. Once we are no
longer dealing with the simple case, but instead have a case involving
failures of drafting or foresight, the ordinary meaning of the language
may deviate further from the legislature's intentions than the judge's
own views do.
This point can also be put in terms of a meta-intent on the part of
the legislature. Would a legislature-knowing that, routinely, it will
draft statutes imprecisely and will fail to foresee developments-want
its language to be taken at face value in all cases? Or would it prefer
for judges to try to follow their understanding of the legislature's purposes, even if that increased the risk that the judges would unconsciously impose their own judgments about policy matters? It is far
from clear that a legislature, faced with such a question, would choose
the course Justice Scalia prescribes. It might prefer to leave itself at
the mercy of judges' more open-ended judgments about legislative
purpose.
In fact, of course, sometimes legislatures do that by design, when
they draft statutes that deliberately leave an issue unresolved. In such
cases, the goals of legislative supremacy and judicial restraint are simply inconsistent-the legislature does not want the judges to be restrained. But even in the absence of such buck-passing, a legislature
might prefer, in cases of imprecise drafting or unforeseen circumstances, to have a judge take a good-faith stab at carrying out its purposes, rather than being held to the ordinary meaning of the words it
has used.
28
29

437 U.S. 153 (1978); see supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
471 U.S. 84 (1985). See supra note 11.
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30
PLAIN MEANING AS COMMON GROUND

This brings me to what I think is the most promising justification
for the use of plain meaning, the one derived from Professor
Schauer's article. 31 One of the functions of law is to resolve disputes.
One way it can resolve disputes is by establishing common ground
among people who would otherwise disagree. We may disagree about
what proper welfare or taxation or environmental policy should be,
but we at least agree that what Congress enacts is the law until it is
changed. This kind of agreement is valuable for many reasons, some
obvious and some subtle. It enables people to plan their actions with
more security. It provides a way for people to manage their disagreements, so that no matter how severe they are, there is at least something they hold in common. And it allows for people to express a
form of mutual respect, by conducting their arguments in terms of
shared premises, instead of by resorting to first principles on which
32
they disagree.
The ordinary meaning of a statute provides this kind of a basis of
agreement. The plain language is significant not (or not exclusively)
because it expresses the legislature's intentions, or for any of the
other reasons I have canvassed, but just because, so to speak, it is
there. It is an obvious thing for people to agree on, when the only
alternative is too-costly disagreement. Professor Schauer offered this
as a descriptive explanation for why the Justices of the Supreme Court
resort to ordinary language: the Justices, he suggested, consider it desirable to establish common ground, and plain language furnishes
such common ground. By and large the Justices can live with the interpretation supplied by the plain language approach; each of them
may think that it is not perfect from his or her point of view, but each
recognizes that others have different ideas about what is perfect. The
plain language is good enough, and the alternative would be potentially divisive disagreement. Schauer offers this mostly as a descriptive,
not normative account, although he acknowledges that it provides a
"plausible normative argument" for the plain language approach.3 3 It
30
31

See Schauer, supra note 3, at 250.
Seei&

32 These ideas about the function of law go back to Aristotle and were expounded by Hume. SeeAlusTLoE, THE NicoMAcH
rN, ETHICS 1134b, 18-35 (Terence
Irwin trans., Hackett Publ., Co. 1985); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE
489-90 (LA. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1978); DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 125 (Bobbs-Merrill 1957). For other sources, see Schauer,
supra note 3, at 254 n.86; and David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877, 908 n.73 (1996).

33

See Schauer, supra note 3, at 232.
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seems to me the argument can be made both normative and more
general: notjust for the Supreme Court, but for the legal community
generally, and to some degree for the society as a whole, plain lan34
guage can perform such a unifying function.
This may be the most satisfactory justification for the plain meaning approach that dominates the Supreme Court's statutory construction cases: it provides an easy, relatively non-divisive way to resolve
difficult issues. It is a considerable benefit to have such a way of
resolving these questions. But that benefit does not outweigh every
cost. Sometimes a departure from plain meaning might be justified.
If ajudge is convinced that the plain meaning leads to a result that is
grossly at variance with the legislature's understandings-or if the
judge believes that the legislature intended the statute to develop to
deal with new circumstances, and that following plain meaning will
hamper that intention unduly-then a departure from plain meaning
is warranted. Following plain meaning is not a matter of constitutional command, or legislative supremacy, as Justice Scalia suggests. It
is simply a useful way of getting a matter settled so that we can move
on. When the value of doing that is outweighed, plain meaning is not
the right approach.
One final example, again drawn from Professor Schauer's article
on this subject, may make this point. Schauer suggests that the Justices are especially likely to use plain meaning when the subject matter
of a statute is particularly esoteric and the Justices lack expertise in the
area.3 5 His argument is that the Justices are especially likely to distrust
their (and their colleagues') ability, in such areas, to reach the answers that are right as a matter of first principles, so the reasons to use
plain language, as a second-best solution, are especially compelling.
As a descriptive matter that seems at least plausible.
It may be, however, that the use of plain meaning is in fact least
justified in such areas. At least that will be true if an elaborate set of
common-law-like understandings has developed that is at variance
with the plain meaning. One of the most questionable trends in the
Supreme Court's statutory decisions in recent years has been the tendency to use the plain meaning to sweep away understandings of statutes that have grown up, often over many years or decades, among the
institutions directly involved in their enforcement, such as administrative agencies and lower courts. The Supreme Court sometimes seems
to conclude that it owes little deference to those understandings when
34 I offer a similar argument about the text of the Constitution in Strauss, supra
note 32, at 916-24.
35

See Schauer, supra note 3, at 253-54.
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they are inconsistent with (what the Court takes to be) the ordinary
meaning of the statute. 6
This kind of decision-casting aside well-established understandings of what a statute requires because they are inconsistent with the
plain language-might be justifiable if one accepted one of the other
justifications I have canvassed for the plain language approach. If following the ordinary meaning were the best way to carry out legislative
intentions, then the accumulated understandings perhaps should be
discarded; the legislature's intentions should be vindicated instead.
Certainly if Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution required the plain
meaning approach, one could not deviate from that approach simply
because the institutions that have administered a statutory scheme
had arrived at a different understanding about its requirements. Or if
one believed that considerations of legislative supremacy and judicial
restraint required following the plain meaning, the fact that various
lower courts had deviated from plain meaning would not be a reason
for the Supreme Court to continue to do so.
But none of these justifications for the plain meaning approach is
really adequate. As I have said, the best justification for plain meaning is a much less weighty one: it provides a basis of agreement that
reduces the danger of unproductive and costly disagreement. When
there is already a settled understanding among the lower courts and
the agencies involved in interpreting a statute, then there is already a
basis for agreement. It is correspondingly much less necessary to resort to plain meaning. Moreover, that settled understanding may reflect the accumulated experience and insight of those involved in
carrying out the statutory scheme. Arguably that experience should
not count if legislative supremacy, or the commands of the Constitution, were at stake. But if they are not-and, as I have said, in plain
meaning cases, other than the "simple case" that is unlikely to end up
in litigation, they will probably not be-then the collective institutional wisdom that constitutes the "common law" in an area should
count for something, perhaps for quite a lot.
That is not to say that plain meaning should never be used to
upset settled understandings. It is possible for a subculture to develop
around a particular statutory scheme, a subculture that develops
norms that are at odds with the legislative decision about an issue. If
so, the legislative decision should prevail. But that has to be the argument: that there is some reason, in addition to the bare language of
the statute, to believe that the settled understanding is at variance with
36

See Peter L. Strauss, Or Resegregatingthe Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994

Sup. CT.

REv. 429.
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the initial legislative understanding. The plain meaning approach is
the right one to use in an important range of disputes. But it should
not be given a priority that outruns its justification.
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